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REMARKS OF . SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)
AT THE REGIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS

/

THE BROWN PALACE HOTEL, DENVER, COLORADO
OCTOBER 31, 1972, 12:00 NOON, M. S. T.

CHINA AND SHIFTING POLICIES IN ASIA

It is fashionable these days to make critical appraisals
of the quality of our institutions.

These appraisals of the media,

Congress, the Presidency and whatever, are not to be scorned,
even when we are put out by what may seem to us to be their
invalidity.

In the end, institutions are better off for the sum

total of criticism.

It provides a continuous test of their vitality.

Institutions which react to criticism, whether . it is accepted or
resented, are, at least, live institutions and if they are alive,
there is hope that they have or can deve_lop the capacity to serve
the human purposes for which they are intended.
Over a long period of public service, I have noticed that
criticism tends to move in waves of greater or lesser amplitude.
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This year, it is the Presidential electoral process, last year
/

the courts or the Congress and before that the press or the
- universities.

If there is one certainty underlying the shifting
I

pulsations, however, it is that natio~al perspectives are a~so in
continuous flux, enabling adjustments to be made in our system
which preserve1 the nation's continuity.
It is to

t~is

phenomenon of shifting

pers~ective,

parti-

cularly as it effects the problem of the Far East that I would
like to address myself today.

The past year and a half has been

a period of momentous changes in the whole structure of the nation's
foreign policy.

These changes derive from profound revisions in

the basic assumptions which have guided our national destiny for
a quarter of a century.
friends .

Old enemies have been embraced as new

Old causes have been exposed to new light and in that

light have often revealed the tarni sh of obsolescence.
have toppled and crumbled •

.·
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- 3 Regrettably, these insights have come to us far too
/

slowly in many cases.

As a nation, we have paid an enormous

price for the delays.

For a host of reasons, for which both my
I

profession and yours must bear a gre.a t deal of blame, our lnational
perspectives on foreign policy have tended to calcify in certain
situations.

When that has occurred, myth has superceded reality

as the basis for our foreign policies.

The most pervasive of

these myths and, as it turned out, the most damaging, was that
related to the People's Republic of China.

Two decades ago, a

revolutionary China came to be seen as a towering dragon, held
on a leash by Moscow, enveloping cringing neighbors in billowing
clouds of smoke and fire.
The myth was born from the total Nationalist collapse
on the Chinese mainland.

As some of you will remember, this up-

-

heaval produced enormous repercussions on the American political
scene.
China."

We searched everywhere for the culprits who had "lost
An America which had just "lost" a monopoly of nuclear

4

weapons, in part through the operations of international espionage,
/

could not understand "losing China" except in terms of conspiracy
and betrayal.

Flushed with the omnipotence of our military might
I

during World War II, it had not yet dawned on us that a nation
of more than 800 million was not ours or anyone else's to win or
lose.
Our response to what had transpired in China was to
erect a ring of treaties to choke off what was thought to be
China's aggressive designs.

SEATO and the mutual defense treaties

with the Republic of Chi na, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, all
formed segments of the r i ng.

With these treaties came U. S. bases,

U. S. troops to man the bases, bill i ons of dollars in military
a i d, and advisors to show our allies how to use the arms.

It was

as though we were trying to pen the wild dragon with pacts and
programs.

Anyone having the slightest acquaintance with the

made-in Japan super-science fict i on whi ch is shown on the TV
networks knows that it takes a lot more.
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/

thought to be reckless, belligerent and powerful, the Chinese
leaders saw themselves as engaged in a bootstrap operation, minding
I

their own business and beset on all sides by hostility.

Ch~a

denounced U. S. defense policies, the U. S. boycott and U. S. support
of Taiwan as extensions of the Western World's efforts for 150 years
to dominate and exploit China.
Now, after a long and surly confrontation, the United States
and China have begun the journey to restore normal relations.

To

bring about this change, the President of the United States, himself,
entered the dragon's lair and emerged not only unscathed, but, clearly
reassured, exhilarated and certainly, as the TV coverage revealed,
well-fed.
I applauded the President's initiative at the time and I
have done so many times since.

Its significance is in no way dimin-

ished by the fact that there has not been a rapid or dramatic followup.

Clearly, that was not the intention of the visit.

v
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Nevertheless, when President Nixon and Premier Chou touched
'
glass~s

in Peking's Great Hall of the People, waves of subsurface

motion were set in motion in Asia.

The moment marked the beginning

of a new era in our relations with China and the Western Paeific.
p
The basis for this change, to a large extent, is to be found in what
has taken place inside China.
Senator Scott and I spent sixteen days in the Chinese
People's Republic last April and May and both of us reached substantially the same conclusions about what had taken place within
China.

Our conclusions, moreover, do not differ greatly from those

of other recent American visitors who may have had, as did we, some
previous exposure to the old China.
The contrast is extraordinary.

The present system enjoys

general and, perhaps, enthusiastic acceptance.

It does so notwith-

standing the fact that -China is controlled more clesely than ever before and is far more tightly organized.

It does so notwithstanding

the absence of intellectual and artistic freedom and representative
government in our sense of these terms.

I
t
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- 7 It should be borne in mind that our values are not those
of

th~ ' Chinese

people.

What appean3to be of great relevance to us

may have little meaning on the other side of the Pacific.

What is

clearly of significance in China, today, is the fact that the present
v

system provides adequate food, shelter, clothing and simple consumer
goods.

It has led to great advances in public cleanliness and order,

in health care, in basic and technical education, in transportation,
electrification and the like.

It has developed a diversified national

economy which is able to manufacture--and to manufacture solely out
of Chinese resources and skills--tens of thousands of modern products.
There are Chinese-made automobiles, tractors and electric buses, not
to speak of Chinese-made hydro-electric generators and nuclear devices.
What is of great relevance to the Chinese, too, is that
the structure of national control is manned from top to bottom,
not by a conspicuous and highly privileged elite as in the past

\

- 8 but by men and women who work among the people, who dress
like them and live with them.

Conformity there is, as there

has always been in China, but it is not the conformity induced

b
by a visible whip.
absence.

Indeed, enforcers were conspicuous by their
I do not think I saw more than an armed person

or two of any kind during 5,000 miles of travel in China.
What is to be found is a general sense of participation
in nation-building.

A bona fide national family is emerging,

with a "one for all and all for one" concept of social and
economic development.

The present system seems to have succeeded

in undergirding the personal pride of the Chinese in China.
Chou En-lai put it, "The Chinese people can stand up again."
As never before, China seems strong, dynamic, unified and
virtually classless.

,
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As this vast uplift has gained in momentum, nations
/

have beat a path to China's door.
for the beginning of rapprochement.

For us, the time was over-ripe
The fact is that, for several
I

years, hostility between the United States and China hsa bben
receding.

Long before the President's visit, this country had

ceased to be, in China's eyes, an unmitigated ogre.

Our policies

chose to ignore this change in Chinese outlook for many years but
actually, the focus of Peking's concern began to shift elsewhere
a decade ago, notably to the Soviet Union and to Japan. ·Only the
intrusion of the Vietnamese involvement concealed the extent of
the shift.
Today, the Soviet Union appears to give greater .cause
for anxiety to the Chinese than does the United States.

That is,

of course, a reversal of the situation of two decades ago.

In

the early days of the People's Republic, historical irritants,
having to do with Soviet encroachments bn the reaches of Chinese
civilization into Central Asia and Manchuria were ignored in the

I
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light of what seemed to be ideological solidarity.

The communist

/

bond between the two nations, moreover, was reinforced by the
unifying impact of the hostility which was directed at both
countries from the Uni ted States and other nations.
Differences in ideology have since come to light between
China and the Soviet Union.
wounds of history.

Border clashes have again opened the

The one-million Soviet troops and allied

Mongolian forces along the inner Chinese border are now regarded
as at least as menacing as American military installations on
Okinawa, Guam, the Philippines or other :P-laces in the Pacific or
..

the prospect of a re-armed Japan.
If the recent visits of President Nixon and the .Congressional leadership signal the official end of the "cold war" in
Asia, the successful mission of Prime Minister
Peking confirms it.

T~naka

of Japan to

In turn, Sino-Japanese rapprochement foreshadows ·

the further erosion of the special United States relationship with
Japan which has existed since World War II.

, I
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The passing or the era or this special relationship,
in my ,Judgment, is all to the good.

The fact is that for a quarter

of a century Japan has depended on the United States not only for
security but also for economic well-being.

For us, the

arra~gement
~

has been costly.

For the Japanese, the sense of inferiority which

it has implied has become increasingly intolerable, as the experiences of World War II have receded into the past and Japan has
risen to the level of the third economic power of the world.
Premier Tanaka's initiative towards China opens up
more than new possibilities for Japanese trade.

It also uncovers

a potential for new and constructive political relationships with
other nations in Asia.

In due course, Japan's rapprochement with

China is likely to have significant impact on the U. S.-Japanese
mutual defense
security relationship since it alters the basic rationale or the/
treaty.

Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more extensive erosion of

a premise than that which has swept away the assumptions on which
the treaty was based two decades ago.

Those assumptions saw an

aggressive China restrained from pouncing on Japan at the behest

I
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of an aggressive Soviet Union only .by grace of the interposition
of

u./ s.

military might.

So complete has been the reversal of

these assumptions that the President has been able to visit in
I

one year, both Peking and Moscow and receive in both capita~s a
most cordial welcome.

And so, too, have the Japanese leaders.

What the comings and goings of heads-of-states indicate
is that the dikes of post World War II relationships have given
way in Asia.

Erosive tides are at work on the existing alignments

among the large nations--China, Japan, the Soviet Union and the
United States.

They are also being felt among the smaller nations.

After two decades of hurling invective at each other, for example,
the two Koreas are talking of stabilization of the situation on the
Korean peninsula.

Lying as it does in the triangle between China,

the Soviet Union, and Japan, that stabilization is essential to a
durable peace in Asia.

It is a key to political balance at the

Northeast Asian corner of the Asian mainland in a way similar to
that of Indochina in Southeast Asia.

A solution to the Korean

- 13 -
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question on the basis of unification. and neutralization is
likely to lie a long way in the future but at least the signs
- or a beginning are in the air.
'

As for Thailand, it has . followed the American lea~ and
accepted a Chinese invitation to take its table tennis team to
Peking.

There is renewed dialogue between Indonesia and China.

In all probability, it is only a matter of time before Thailand,
Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand
follow the U. S. lead in restoring political contact with China.
In sum, the leaves of past policies, myths and mistakes
are scurrying into history.
in Asia.

A new era has already begun to emerge

Still intact, however, is the ring of anti-Chinese

treaties which was put together two decades ago by the United
States.

Robbed of a militant China to check, these treaties are

now more shadow than substance.

Yet, they cost us enormously out

of our resources and will continue to do so for as long as they
remain in their present form.

·I
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The fact is that the United States has no vital interests
/

on the Asian continent which warrant the kind of massive commitment
of men and material that we have witnessed in Indochina and elsewhere in Asia during the past decade •.
That is not to say that the United States i ·s not a
Pacific power.

As distinct from the Asian mainland, we do have

vital interests in what transpires in the Pacific Ocean.

To safe-

guard these interests in present circumstances, however, does not
require us to maintain hundreds of thousands of forces and over a
hundred major military bases in and around the rim of Asia at a
cost of billions of dollars annually.

Commitments to join in the

defense of this region against aggression does not require us to ·
garrison various countries with U. S. troops or to deluge them
with vast quantities of costly arms and assistance.
Treaties and agreements and aid-programs are not chiseled
into stone.

Like any other aspect of a nation's policies, they

must be kept current if the public interest is to be served.
Insofar as Asia is involved, we should match our commitments,

- 15 (

deployment of military forces and expenditures of resources

~o

/

today's realities and not in conformity with the myths of the
past.

This principle certainly applies to the Japanese - U. S.
,,

Security Treaty, the Korean Treaty,

~o

SEATO and to the

va~ious

costly aid-programs and defense arrangements to which they have
given rise.

It would be my hope that the next Administration--

regardless of its political complexion--will move promptly to
make necessary adjustments.

Certainly, the change in attitude

towards China, on the part of both the United States and · Japan
has opened up substantial possibilities in this connection.
Overshadowing the hopeful developments in Asia of
the last year there mngs the war in Indochina.
which seems to feed on itself.

It generates its own momentum,

increasingly unrelated to any conceivable
nation.
. our

.

~

It is a war

.1::1~

interest of this

It is war whose continuance, indeed, does violence to

interests.

'

'
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/

own inertia, perhaps, by our own emphasis · o.n "saving face," a
luxury which once was assumed to be exclusively an oriental
prerogative.
U.

s.

Whatever the case, the

~ar

drags on.

The forms of

engagement change and so, too, does the rationale of engagement .

But our deep and costly involvement on the Southeast Asian mainland
seems to go on forever.
My sentiments regarding this situation, I am sure, have

been known to all of you for many years.

I continue to hope that

before, on, or immediately after the election--the sooner the better;we will bring to an end this deadly travesty.

That we should have

done so years ago makes the urgency no less compelling.
For a decade, we have pursued a war in which we became
involved because of the calcificat1on of our policies towards China.
Those policies lost whatever basis they may have had years ago.
Thanks to the President, we have broken out of their ancient ·grip.

• I

- 17 Is it not time now that we also recognized that a hideous derivative
of those policies, the military involvement in Indochina, is even more
invalid?

If the old China policy was wrong, how can our continued

immersion in Viet Nam possibly be right?
The horror of unnecessary deaths and . injuries, inflicted on
Americans, Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians is bad enough.

But,

that is not the end of the price which is being paid for persistance
in this abomination.

Nor does the price ·end in terms of the. immense

burdens which the war place_s on the nation's economy or in the . divisiveness which the war injects, as a deadly drug, into the inner unity of
this nation.

The war also continues to distort international relation-

ships in the Western Pacifi·c and inhibits our capacity to make timely
adjustments in our approach to that region.
Critical questions of policy in the Western Pacific lie
beyond Viet Nam; they lie beyond Cambodia and beyond Laos.

These

r emote rice-cultures of Southeast Asia will some day return to the
obscurity which they once enjoyed.

The challenge of forei gn policy

in Asia i s i n the building of a new foundation for peace in the
Wester n Pacifi c ~

[
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If we are to contribute effectively to that high

purpose~

/

it is imperative
--that we ena our military involvement in Indochina
forthwith,
. --that we adjust downward our direct military involvement in the Western Pacific to correspond to the changed political
situation,
--that we begin now to pursue a diplomacy seeking, in
time, to establish a quadripartite base of China, Japan, the Soviet
Union and the United States on which to build the peace and
stability of the region.
To be able to do what must be done for the future of
this nation in the Pacific:
--We must concentrate on making American products competitive in world markets once more, and forego the building of
walls of monetary and trade isolationism around ourselves;
--We must cease wasting our national substance and our

'
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- 19 energy on irrelevant military adventures and questionable client
governments in Asia;
--We must redouble our efforts to establish a durable
I

framework of understanding with all .Asian nations, through more
effective use of the whole range of information media, through
candor and courage in our official appraisals and through cultural
exchanges with all the nations of Asia.
The waters of the Pacific break on the shores of the
United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and China.

We are all

Pacific powers with common interests in the possibilities of
..

peaceful relations in the region.

The cold war is over· in Asia.

May we find the wisdom, now, to match our policies to the opportunities which the new situation presents.

In so doing, we will

be able to turn our energies and our efforts once again to building
peace in the Pacific and in 'the world, for ourselves, our children
and our children's children.

